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Lilly: Constitutional Law--Public School Desegregation--Pupil Placement
CASE COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Public School Desegregation-Pupil
Placement Plan
Judicial cognizance of the fact that Atlanta public schools had
been and were being operated on a racially segregated basis led
to the court's entertaining a submitted plan whereby racial discrimination was to be discontinued. The plan effectuates desegregation, beginning at the twelfth grade and extending successively each
year to a lower grade until all grades are included, requiring a
total period of twelve years. Held, approved. The plan is reasonable and meets the requirement that desegregation take place with
all deliberate speed. Calhoun v. Board of Educ., 188 F. Supp. 401
(N.D. Ga. 1959). Subsequently, the court decreed that the plan
should become effective in September, 1961. Calhoun v. Latimer,
188 F. Supp. 412 (N.D. Ga. 1960).
P contested the proposed plan in the principal case on three
main grounds: first, that the plan generally failed to satisfy the
tests laid down in the second Brown decision. Brown v. Board of
Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955); second, that the plan refused a consideration of the possibility of threat of disorder among pupils and
the community; and third, that the administrative procedure for
applicants under the plan was inadequate. The first of these is
examined in some detail below. As to the second, the court cited
the Supreme Court which held that, however important it may be
to maintain the public peace, it "cannot be accomplished by laws
or ordinances which deny rights created or protected by the federal
constitution." Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958). In conforming with P's third contention, the court ordered a change of the
plan's administrative procedure to insure prompt hearings and results once applications for transfers or placement had been made.
For an able discussion of this phase see Meador, The Constitution
and the Assignment of Pupils to Public Schools, 45 VA. L. REv. 517,
544 (1959).
The first Brown decision declared the fundamental principle
that racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional and
that all laws requiring such discrimination must succumb to this
principle. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The
second Brown decision considered the manner in which relief was
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to be granted. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). In
the latter case the court provided that the primary responsibility
for assessing and solving these problems rests upon the school
authorities. The courts are then to determine whether the governing
constitutional principles have been adequately implemented by such
actions. The requirement stressed in the decision was a reasonable
and prompt start toward full compliance.
Several decisions are in general accord with the principal case
in holding that desegregation plans starting at one school grade
which would include all grades after twelve years comply with the
requirements of the second Brown decision. Boson v. Rippy, 285
F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1960); Kelly v. Board of Educ., 270 F.2d 209
(6th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 924 (1959); Aaron v.
Cooper, 243 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 566
(1958). However, there are two notable exceptions. The first of
these is a Delaware case, Evans v. Ennis, 281 F.2d 385 (3d Cir.
1960). The court rejected a twelve year plan calling for desegregation commencing at the first grade. The unusual approach of the
court was that integration in Delaware should not be gauged by
the more restrictive standards applicable to those communities which
have not advanced so far toward integration. The other rejection
of the twelve year plan was upon entirely different grounds. Borders
v. Rippey, 184 F. Supp. 402 (N.D. Tex. 1960). The Texas court,
after an elaborate discussion, concluded that such a plan would
necessarily result in an amalgamation which the court considered
the "most objectionable of all integration features." The court rejected any integration plan pursued by force, rather pointing out
the need of "integration by consent," resulting from a plan which
would not provoke a general shifting and transferring of the school
population. The ultimately approved plan was one in which those
who desired to integrate might do so, and those who were opposed
might not be forced to do so. In effect, the holding was that the
court cannot require segregation but may permit it. As stated by
Meador, 45 VA. L. REv. supra, such an attitude is not unconstitutional as the Constitution "merely forbids discrimination."
The West Virginia Constitution provides that "white and colored persons shall not be taught in the same school," and a state
statute contains a similar provision. W. VA. CONST., art. XII, § 8;
W. VA. CODE, ch. 18, art. 5, § 14 (Michie 1955). While no state
statutes or reported cases are found concerning public school place-
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ment plans, it appears quite obvious that West Virginia has not encountered the many integration problems present in other jurisdictions. In general, the state has moved promptly in compliance with
the mandate of the Supreme Court and has the distinction of being
the first in the southern and border region to comply with the Court's
order, though, as could be expected, a few of the more southern
counties have been lax in following the prescript. See Charleston
Gazette, May 4, 1961, p. 1, col. 8. A practical attitude of cooperation on the part of state and local authorities largely accounts
for the orderly accomplishments attained in the state. This position
is indicated by an opinion of the Attorney General of West Virginia,
dated June 1, 1954, concerning integration at West Virginia University in particular and in the state in general. The opinion observed
that the above mentioned constitutional and statutory provisions
are "rendered null and void, and are now of no force and effect"
because of the Supreme Court decision. 45 W. VA. Ops. ATT'Y.
GEN. 725 (1954). By a subsequent letter of June 9, 1954, not
reported as an official opinion, the Attorney General held that his
June 1 opinion applied "also to all state operated schools and
colleges under the jurisdiction of the West Virginia Board of Education." See Starling v. Board of Educ., 175 F. Supp. 703, 705 (S.D.
W. Va. 1959).
These decisions serve only to demonstrate that the term "all
deliberate speed" as employed by the Supreme Court in reference
to integration of public schools is a relative one, dependent upon
varying facts and circumstances in different localities. Certainly,
the idea here is progress toward elimination of compulsory segregation; but just as certain is the necessity of maintaining a concept
of sound educational standards and a salutary educational atmosphere. The duty of solving the many and varied local problems
involved in establishing racially non-segregated schools is the duty
of the school authorities, and of the public as well. Such problems
concerned the court in its decree delaying the effective date of the
public placement plan approved in the principal case. Calhoun v.
Latimer, supra, pp. 414-15. For some, this duty connotes an inevitable deadline of compliance; for others, a choice between segregated schools or no public school system at all.
Robert Glenn Lilly, Jr.
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